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Patent Law Revisionism at the Supreme Court?
Ted Sichelman*
The Supreme Court generally may overrule, revise, or disregard its
precedent. However, the Court lacks such discretion when Congress
codifies prior judicial precedent. Yet, the Court has repeatedly subverted
Congress’s codification of scienter standards for indirect patent
infringement. This Essay describes in detail the Court’s bungled—
essentially revisionist—interpretations of its precedent in Aro Mfg. Co.
v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. in 1964 and in Global-Tech v. SEB
in 2011. Indeed, this Essay suggests that the Court in Global-Tech
engaged in intentional obfuscation, very likely via a law clerk and
unbeknownst the Justices. In the very least, the Justices abdicated their
responsibility to fully review the applicable cases and legislative history
in forming the decision.
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INTRODUCTION
When Congress passes a statute codifying judicial doctrine, the
judiciary is expected to read that doctrine with fidelity. To do otherwise
would of course subvert the intent of Congress. However, in the context
of the appropriate scienter standard for indirect patent infringement, this
Essay argues that the Court has not once, but twice, engaged in such
subversion—first in 1964 in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co. (Aro II)1 and again in 2011 in Global-Tech v. SEB.2
Indeed, this Essay suggests that in Global-Tech, the Court very likely
engaged in intentional obfuscation of the applicable judicial doctrine in
order to reach a result it sought on policy grounds. Although it is unlikely
that the individual Justices were aware of such obfuscation—rather, it
was likely the machinations of a law clerk straining to reach the Court’s
desired outcome in the case—the Justices’ ostensible failure to review the
relevant case law and legislative history in sufficient detail was a gross
dereliction of their judicial duties.
Indirect infringement covers activities that are akin to aiding and
abetting direct patent infringement.3 Two provisions in the Patent Act of
1952 codify long-standing patent doctrine deriving from tort law that
those who aid and abet direct infringement shall be liable for indirect
infringement. In the 1952 Patent Act there is a specific provision, section
271(c), which covers “contributory infringement” for supplying a
component that is especially adapted for use in a direct infringement.
Section 271(c) states in relevant part:
Whoever . . . sells . . . a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition . . . knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent,
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.4
1. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
2. 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
3. Direct patent infringement arises from the unauthorized making, using, selling, offering to
sell, importing, and in limited instances, exporting, the entire claimed product, composition of
matter, or process. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (f), (g) (2012) (defining patent infringement); see also
Prouty v. Draper, Ruggles & Co., 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336, 340 (1842) (holding that all elements of a
patent must be present for direct infringement liability).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
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The 1952 Act also provides for liability for “inducement” of
infringement in section 271(b), which states that “[w]hoever actively
induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”5
Contributory infringement and inducement of infringement fall under the
general rubric known as “indirect infringement.”6 Notably, unlike direct
infringement, which effectively sounds in strict liability, courts have read
both indirect infringement provisions as including scienter thresholds.
Specifically, (1) for inducing infringement, courts have required specific
intent to further the acts of direct infringement and (2) for contributory
infringement, knowledge that the component sold is especially adapted
for use in a directly infringing product or process.7
Yet, each provision is ambiguous as to whether the indirect infringer
must also have knowledge of the patent-at-issue to be held liable. Section
271(c) states that the infringer must “know[] the [component] to be . . .
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent.”8 Does that
mean the accused infringer must only know the component is especially
adapted for a product that happens to infringe “such patent?” Or must
the accused infringer also know of the patent covering the product?
Section 271(b) states in relevant part “[w]hoever actively induces
infringement of a patent” shall be liable.9 Does such inducement merely
require intent to induce acts that happen to infringe? Or must the accused
5. Id. § 271(b).
6. Prior to the 1952 Act, many commentators referred to what is now termed “indirect
infringement” as “contributory infringement.” However, most commentators today use
“contributory infringement” to refer to infringing activities under section 271(c) stemming from
the sale of a component of an infringing product, and “inducing infringement” to refer to general
aiding and abetting under section 271(b). These two sections, along with certain exporting
activities under section 271(f), now constitute the category of “indirect infringement.” See 35
U.S.C. § 271(f) (incorporating in substantial part the scienter standards of sections 271(b) and
271(c)); CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04[2] (2010) (discussing indirect infringement); see also Trs.
of Columbia Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH, 150 F. Supp. 2d 191, 205 n.36 (D. Mass. 2001)
(“Prior to the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271 (the Patent Act of 1952), there was no statute that
defined what constituted infringement. Infringement was divided under the common law into
‘direct infringement’ (the unauthorized making, using or selling of the patented invention) and
‘contributory infringement’ (a theory of joint tortfeasance, where an actor, though not technically
making, using or selling a patented invention, nevertheless displayed sufficient culpability to be
held liable as an infringer).”); Jones v. Radio Corp. of Am., 131 F. Supp. 82, 83–84 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (noting that section 271(b) “includes in its definition of ‘infringer’ a person who does that
which the courts had previously held to be contributory infringement wherein there was intent to
infringe, but not necessarily the sale of a component part of a combination patent. It protects against
one who aids and abets the direct infringer”).
7. See CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04[2] (2013) (discussing knowledge and intent requirements
in cases of infringement).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (emphasis added).
9. Id. § 271(b).
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infringer know of the precise patent those acts infringe?
The issue is one of great importance because numerous potential
infringers do not have actual knowledge of the patent at the time of suit.10
As recounted below, in two cases—Aro II and Global-Tech—the Court
held that knowledge of the patent is required for a showing of indirect
infringement. Although the Court held in Global-Tech that “willful
blindness” could suffice for knowledge, the test is fairly strict and is
unlikely to capture the vast majority of third parties who might otherwise
indirectly infringe a patent but for the Court’s knowledge-of-the-patent
requirement.
Here, this Essay argues that Aro II and Global-Tech were wrongly
decided—indeed, examples of patent law “revisionism” in which the
Court grossly misread, and in Global-Tech arguably obfuscated, the
historical case law and related legislative history. As noted earlier,
Congress stated clearly when it passed the 1952 Act that it was codifying
the historical scienter standard for indirect infringement. As described
below, this historical standard did not require actual knowledge of the
patent-at-issue. Rather, opinions from the Supreme Court and lower
courts from the mid-19th century through the passage of the 1952 Act
repeatedly held that aiding and abetting direct patent infringement
required at most specific intent merely to further the acts that constituted
direct infringement.11 Other than a few lines of aberrant dicta in one case,
the Supreme Court never required knowledge by the aider and abettor
that he was assisting in the breach of a legal duty (i.e., infringement of a
known patent).12 Only one lower court opinion of many held otherwise.13
As a late 19th century article canvassing the case law succinctly stated:
“If he intentionally contributed to the act, which the Court holds to be an
infringement of the patent, he is [an indirect] infringer, and his actual lack
of knowledge of the existence of the patent will not excuse him.”14 This
view persisted through the first half of the 20th century and was blackletter law at the time of the passage of the 1952 Patent Act.15 Given this
10. Cf. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1421 (2009) (finding that actual copying of the patent by the accused infringer is infrequent).
11. See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (noting that only a finding of specific intent
that the items be used with the patented item was required to find liability).
12. See infra Part I (discussing the historical development of the doctrine of indirect
infringement).
13. See infra note 40 and accompanying text (commenting on the aberrant decision in Tubular
Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898)).
14. Hubert Howson, Contributory Infringement of Patents, ELECTRICAL ENGINEER, Feb. 20,
1895, at 174, 175, available at http://books.google.com/books?id=UbvmAAAAMAAJ&dq
=Howson%2C%20contributory%20infringement%20patents&pg=PA174#v=onepage&q=Howso
n,%20contributory%20infringement%20patents&f=false.
15. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
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clear historical precedent and Congress’s intent to codify such precedent
in the 1952 Act, Aro II and Global-Tech can only be read as subversions
of Congress’s intent.
Part I of this Essay sets forth the historical background of the role of
scienter of indirect infringement in patent law, showing that it did not
include a knowledge-of-the-patent requirement. Part II begins by
recounting Congress’s adoption of this historical scienter standard when
it enacted statutory provisions codifying most of the applicable case law
in the Patent Act of 1952. Then, Part II describes the Court’s subsequent
bungled interpretations of this codified standard in its decisions in Aro II
and Global-Tech. Based on this analysis, this Essay suggests that the
Court in Global-Tech—probably via one of its law clerks and without the
knowledge of the Justices—engaged in intentional obfuscation of the
case law, and in the very least, abdicated its responsibility to fully review
the applicable cases and legislative history in forming its decision. 16 This
Essay concludes with some speculations as to why this apparent result
transpired.17
16. Nearly all of the recent articles addressing the scienter requirement for indirect infringement
prior to the Court’s ruling in Global-Tech largely engage in policy-driven analysis to reach their
proposals, overlooking much of the relevant historical case law and related legislative history in
their analyses, focusing instead on Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases mostly bereft of
pertinent historical discussion. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced
Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 408 (2006); Tal Kedem,
Secondary Liability For Actively Inducing Patent Infringement: Which Intentions Pave The Road?,
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1465, 1489–90 (2007); Eric L. Lane, The Federal Circuit’s Inducement
Conflict Resolution: The Flawed Foundation and Ignored Implications of DSU Medical, 6 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 198, 202 (2007); Vivian Lei, Is the Doctrine of Inducement
Dead?, 50 IDEA 875 (2010); Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 225 (2005); Lynda J. Oswald, The Intent Element of “Inducement to Infringe” Under Patent
Law: Reflections on Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 225, 231 (2006); Michael
N. Rader, Toward a Coherent Law of Inducement to Infringe: Why the Federal Circuit Should
Adopt the Hewlett-Packard Standard for Intent Under § 271(b), 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 299 (2000). One
exception is an article by Charles Adams, in which he canvasses much of the historical case law.
See Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369 (2006). Yet, Adams does not parse the language of the
historical cases carefully, incorrectly concluding that the historical cases contained an “inten[t] to
cause infringement” requirement, rather than merely intent to cause acts (that happen to infringe).
Id. at 372–73. For the reasons presented below, such a view is incorrect. See infra Part I (discussing
historical cases holding that knowledge of infringement is not required to prove indirect
infringement).
17. Portions of this Essay appeared in an amicus brief I submitted to the Supreme Court in
Global-Tech as well as an earlier version of this Essay. See Brief of Law Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060
(2011) (No. 10-6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1734376; Ted Sichelman, Minding Patent
Infringement (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 11-051, Jan. 17, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1734380. Since that time, one student note has heavily relied upon my
arguments to make similar ones, though not in as comprehensive a fashion as made here. See
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I. THE HISTORICAL DOCTRINE OF INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT
Early cases in the Supreme Court held that the manufacture, sale, or
use of some—but not all—of the parts of a combination patent does not
constitute infringement. For instance, in 1842, the Court held in Prouty
v. Draper, Ruggles & Co. that “[t]he use of any two of these [three
patented] parts only . . . is, therefore, not the thing patented.”18 Similarly,
in 1863, the Court stated in Eames v. Godfrey that if the accused infringer
“used all the parts but one, and for that substituted another mechanical
structure substantially different in its construction and operation, but
serving the same purpose, he was not guilty of an infringement.”19
In 1871, in Wallace v. Holmes,20 however, a lower court modified the
default rule by adopting a general doctrine of “indirect” (or as it was
called until 1952, “contributory”) infringement.21 The patent-in-suit
concerned an improved lamp, which consisted of a multitude of
components, including a “glass chimney” and a “burner.”22 The accused
infringers manufactured and sold the burners, but not the chimneys, and
argued under the rule of Prouty and Eames that they should not be liable
for infringement, because they “sold only some of the parts included in
the patented combination.”23
Nevertheless, the Wallace court rejected the proffered defense.24 It
specifically noted that the defendants “have exhibited their burner
furnished with a chimney, using it in their sales room, to recommend it
Karthik Kumar, Note, Of Deep-Fryers and (Semiconductor) Chips: Why Ignorance of a Patent is
No Excuse for its Indirect Infringement, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 727 (2012). An article by Jason Rantanen
reviews some of the relevant historical case law and provides a brief critique of the reasoning and
holding in Global-Tech en route to his more general theory of “fault” in patent law, but nothing on
the order of this Essay. See Jason Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement,
60 AM. U. L. REV. 1575 (2011). One practitioner argues mistakenly that the legislative history
supports the Court’s holdings in Aro II and Global-Tech. Donna P. Gonzales, Legislative Intent
Supports a Patent Knowledge Requirement, 40 COLO. LAW. 61 (Nov. 2011). This article is
addressed further below. See infra notes 94, 110.
18. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336, 341 (1842).
19. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 78, 80 (1863).
20. 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).
21. One commentator posits that the use of patent claims, which were not required until 1870,
see Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (repealed 1952), led to the need for a
separate doctrine of indirect infringement. See Edwin M. Thomas, The Law of Contributory
Infringement, 21 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 811, 813 (1939) (“There was no great need then for the
doctrine of contributory infringement but after the act mentioned required the patentee to define,
by means of claims, the limits of his invention it was soon found that claims often imposed technical
limitations which made it hard for the patentee to enforce his just rights against wrongdoers.”).
22. Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 79.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 79–80.
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to customers, and prove its superiority, and, therefore, as a means of
inducing the unlawful use of the complainants’ invention.”25 Drawing
on principles from the common law of torts, the court found that the
defendants “have done this for the express purpose of assisting, and
making profit by assisting, in a gross infringement of the complainants’
patent.”26
The court recognized that, if it did not allow recovery for contributory
infringement:
[The patentee] would be driven to the task of searching out the
individual purchasers for use who actually place the chimney on the
burner and use it—a consequence which, considering the small value of
each separate lamp, and the trouble and expense of prosecution, would
make the complainants helpless and remediless.27

Although the Wallace court’s test might casually be read to require
knowledge of the patent, the court held that scienter turned on the “certain
knowledge that such burners are to be used, as they can only be used, by
the addition of a chimney.”28 Thus, the Wallace decision—which is the
progenitor of all indirect infringement opinions and has been cited with
approval by the Supreme Court29—emphatically did not require any
knowledge of the patent for a finding of indirect infringement.30
About a decade after Wallace v. Holmes, in American Cotton-Tie Co.
v. Simmons,31 the Supreme Court relied on two lower court opinions that
implemented the Wallace rule to find that the sale of a component used
in an infringing combination constituted infringement when “the
defendants prepare and sell the [component] . . . intending to have it
25. Id. at 80.
26. Id. (“In such case, all are tort-feasors, engaged in a common purpose to infringe the patent,
and actually, by their concerted action, producing that result.”).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 179–80 (1980) (“The idea that
a patentee should be able to obtain relief against those whose acts facilitate infringement by others
has been part of our law since Wallace v. Holmes . . . .”); Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany
Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 433 (1894) (“There are doubtless many cases to the
effect that the manufacture and sale of a single element of a combination, with intent that it shall
be united to the other elements, and so complete the combination, is an infringement.” (citing
Wallace)).
30. See Odin B. Roberts, Contributory Infringement of Patent Rights, 12 HARV. L. REV. 35, 37
(1898) (“The act was found to be wrongful because of the obvious intent of the defendants to make
the burner for use only with another thing which the user was to supply.”); cf. Dawson Chemical,
448 U.S. at 188 (“Yet the court [in Wallace] held that there had been ‘palpable interference’ with
the patentee’s legal rights, because purchasers would be certain to complete the combination, and
hence the infringement, by adding the glass chimney.”).
31. 106 U.S. 89 (1894).
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used . . . to produce the results set forth in the [asserted] patents.”32
Importantly, consistent with the common law of torts, the Supreme Court
merely required specific intent on the part of the alleged infringer that the
component be used in the combination that happened to be infringing,
but not that the alleged indirect infringer know of the patent covering the
combination.33
Specifically, regarding the sale of a tie (the unpatented component) for
use in baled cotton (the patented product), the Court found:
They [i.e., the accused infringers] sell the tie having the capacity of use
in the manner described, and intended to be so used. Only the bale of
cotton and the press are needed to produce the result set forth in the
specifications of the patents, and without the bale of cotton and the press
the tie would not be made or sold. The slot through the end-bar of the
buckle in the Cook patent is of no practical use apart from the band and
the bale of cotton . . . and, although a person who merely makes and
sells the buckle or link in each case may be liable for infringing those
patents, he is so liable only as he is regarded as doing what he does with
the purpose of having the buckle or link combined with a band and used
to bale cotton.34

In other words, in American Cotton-Tie, the Supreme Court merely
focused on the indirect infringers’ specific intent with respect to the direct
infringer’s acts, rather than knowledge of the patent-at-issue.
In 1894, in Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping
Paper Co.,35 the Supreme Court cited Wallace v. Holmes and other
cases36 for the proposition that “the manufacture and sale of a single
32. Id. at 95. The Court cited Saxe v. Hammond, 21 F. Cas. 593 (C.C. Mass. 1875) (No. 12,411)
and Bowker v. Dows, 3 F. Cas. 1070 (C.C. Mass. 1878) (No. 1,734), both of which in turn cited
Wallace v. Holmes. In citing Wallace, the Saxe and Bowker courts reaffirmed that specific intent
with respect to the direct infringer’s acts—not knowledge of the patent-in-suit—was of central
concern. See Bowker, 3 F. Cas. at 1071 (“Where the patent was for a combination of the burner
and chimney of a lamp, and the defendant made and sold the burner intending that it should be used
with the chimney, he was held by Judge Woodruff to be liable as an infringer.”); Saxe, 21 F. Cas.
at 594 (“Different parties may all infringe, by respectively making or selling . . . one of the elements
of a patented combination, provided those separate elements are made for the purpose, and with the
intent, of their being combined by a party having no right to combine them.”).
33. American Cotton-Tie, 106 U.S. at 95.
34. Id. at 94–95 (emphasis added); see also id. at 95 (“Because the defendants prepare and sell
the arrow tie, composed of the buckle or link and the band, intending to have it used to bale cotton
and to produce the results set forth in the Cook and the McComb patents, they infringe those
patents.” (emphasis added)).
35. 152 U.S. 425 (1894).
36. Oddly, Morgan Envelope did not cite the Court’s earlier opinion in American Cotton-Tie,
which led the Court in Dawson Chemical to mistakenly note “[t]he doctrine of contributory
infringement was first addressed by this Court in Morgan Envelope.” Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm
& Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 189 (1980) (citation omitted).
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element of a combination, with intent that it shall be united to the other
elements, and so complete the combination, is an infringement.”37
Importantly, the Supreme Court again held that specific intent as to the
direct infringer’s act to combine the component with other elements so
as to create a combination (that happened to be patented) was the relevant
scienter inquiry—and not whether the alleged contributory infringer
knew it was aiding infringement per se, i.e., had knowledge of the patentin-suit.38
In the following years, numerous lower court cases cited to the holding
of Wallace v. Holmes as well as to the Supreme Court’s adoption of the
Wallace rule in American Cotton-Tie and Morgan Envelope.39 Nearly all
of these lower court cases adhered to the established rule that the scienter
required for indirect infringement is specific intent with respect to the
direct infringer’s acts, but not knowledge of the patent-at-issue.40
37. Morgan Envelope, 152 U.S. at 433.
38. The Court ultimately held in Morgan Envelope that contributory infringement did not apply
“where the element made by the alleged infringer is an article of manufacture perishable in its
nature.” Id.
39. See, e.g., Renwick v. Pond, 20 F. 536, 540 (C.C.N.Y. 1872) (citing Wallace); Saxe v.
Hammond, 21 F. 593, 594 (C.C. Mass. 1875) (citing Prouty v. Ruggles, Byam v. Farr, Foster v.
Moore, and Eames v. Godfrey); Rumford Chem. Works v. Hecker, 20 F. Cas. 1342, 1346 (C.C.N.J.
1876) (No. 12,134) (citing Wallace and Renwick v. Pond); Richardson v. Noyes, 20 F. Cas. 723,
724 (C.C. Mass. 1876) (No. 11,792) (“[T[his makes them in law infringers, if their standards, when
combined with the carriages in the mode in which they are designed to be combined, infringe the
patent.”); Bowker v. Dows, 3 F. 1070, 1071 (C.C. Mass. 1878) (citing Wallace); Holly v. Mach.
Co., 4 F. 74, 79 (C.C. Vt. 1880) (citing Wallace); Boyd v. Cherry, 50 F. 279, 282 (C.C. Iowa 1883)
(citing Wallace); Travers v. Beyer, 26 F. 450, 450 (C.C.N.Y. 1886) (citing Wallace); Alabastine
Co. v. Payne, 27 F. 559, 560 (C.C.N.Y. 1886) (citing Wallace and American Cotton-Tie); Snyder
v. Bunnell, 29 F. 47, 48 (C.C.N.Y. 1886) (citing Wallace and American Cotton-Tie); Celluloid Mfg.
Co. v. Am. Zylonite Co., 30 F. 437, 439–40 (C.C.N.Y. 1887) (noting the defendant “has become,
to the extent to which it employs the [patented] improvement, an infringer”); Heaton Peninsular
Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 297 (6th Cir. 1896) (citing Wallace,
American Cotton-Tie, and Morgan Envelope); Shickle, Harrison & Howard Iron Co. v. St. Louis
Car-Coupler Co., 77 F. 739, 743 (8th Cir. 1896) (citing Wallace and American Cotton-Tie);
Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Ry. Specialty Co., 75 F. 1005, 1007 (2d Cir. 1896)
(citing Wallace and American Cotton-Tie); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co.
(Thomson-Houston II), 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir. 1897) (citing Wallace, American Cotton-Tie, and
Morgan Envelope); Red Jacket Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 82 F. 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1897) (citing Wallace);
Am. Graphophone Co. v. Leeds, 87 F. 873, 878 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898) (finding liability where “[t]he
design of the defendants’ machine, and their intent in selling it, are to have it used in connection
with the engraved sound record of the complainant”); Loew Filter Co. v. German Am. Filter Co.,
107 F. 949, 950 (6th Cir. 1901) (citing Heaton Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty
Co., Edison Electric Light Co. v. Peninsular Light, and Thomson-Houston); Canda v. Mich.
Malleable Iron Co., 124 F. 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1903) (citing Heaton and Edison); James Heekin Co.
v. Baker, 138 F. 63, 66 (8th Cir. 1905) (Van Devanter, Circuit Judge) (citing Heaton and Edison).
40. See supra note 39 (citing cases). The only exception appears to be Tubular Rivet & Stud
Co. v. O’Brien, which misread several earlier opinions to incorrectly find “that a necessary
condition of the defendant’s guilt is his knowledge of the complainant’s patent.” 93 F. 200, 202–
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In this regard, the Thomson-Houston line of cases is of particular note.
In 1896, in Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Railway Specialty
Co. (Thomson-Houston I),41 the court quoted Wallace v. Holmes and a
number of other post-Wallace cases for the proposition that the sale of
components “which are useful only for the purpose of performing
functions involved in the operation of the patent . . . raises a presumption
that [the accused infringers] intend their [components] should be so
used.”42 And like Wallace v. Holmes, while the language used in
Thomson-Houston I—e.g., “the intentional aiding of one person by
another in the unlawful making or selling or using of the patented
invention”43—could be indiscriminately interpreted to require
knowledge of the patent for a finding of contributory infringement, a
careful reading shows that such knowledge was not at issue in that case
nor in the ones it cites.44
The author of an article briefly cited in Thomson-Houston I (and later
cited in Global-Tech)45 reviewing many of the 19th century cases
confirmed that intent as to the direct infringer’s acts, not knowledge of
the patent-in-suit, was the relevant concern in making the scienter
standard of contributory infringement:
The principle [of contributory infringement] requires an intention on the
part of the defendant to participate in the act which constitutes the
infringement. By this it is not meant that the party must have known of
the patent and intended to infringe it. If he intentionally contributed to
the act, which the Court holds to be an infringement of the patent, he is
an infringer, and his actual lack of knowledge of the patent will not
excuse him. The publication of patents is assumed in law to be
sufficient notice to the public of their existence.46

Similarly, one of the leading patent law treatises of the late 19th
century stated, “To make or sell a single element, with the intent that it
shall be united to the other elements, and so complete the combination, is
infringement.”47
In Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co. (Thomson-Houston

05 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898).
41. 72 F. 1016 (C.C. Conn. 1896).
42. Id. at 1018.
43. Id. at 1017 (quoting Howson, supra note 14, at 174).
44. See id. at 1017–19 (discussing the scienter required to prove intent to infringe).
45. See infra notes 145–47.
46. Howson, supra note 14, at 175 (emphasis added).
47. 3 WILLIAM CALLYHAN ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 101
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1890).
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II),48 the majority opinion—written by then-Sixth Circuit Judge William
Howard Taft—arrived at the same conclusion as Thomson-Houston I
regarding the appropriate scienter standard:
[W]here one makes and sells one element of a combination covered by
a patent with the intention and for the purpose of bringing about its use
in such a combination he is guilty of contributory infringement and is
equally liable to the patentee with him who in fact organizes the
complete combination.49

Judge Taft also remarked, “An infringement of a patent is a tort
analogous to trespass . . . . From the earliest times, all who take part in a
trespass, either by actual participation therein or by aiding and abetting
it, have been held to be jointly and severally liable for the injury
inflicted.”50 In this regard, the standard common law rule in tort for
specific intent is that the aider and abettor must intend to encourage the
acts of the direct tortfeasor, but need not know that the direct tortfeasor’s
acts are unlawful.51
In 1907, in Cortelyou v. Johnson & Co.,52 the Supreme Court briefly
addressed a claim of indirect infringement and a separate claim for
inducement of breach of contract for the sale of ink for use with a patented
machine, the “Neostyle,” which by the terms of its sale was to be used
with the seller’s ink.53 In dismissing the claims, the Court wrote:
True, the defendant filled a few orders for ink to be used on a rotary
Neostyle, but it does not appear that it ever solicited an order for ink to
be so used, that it was ever notified by the plaintiffs of the rights which
they claimed, or that anything which it did was considered by them an
infringement upon those rights. Further, none of the chief executive
officers of the company had knowledge of the special character of the
rotary Neostyle machine or the restrictions on the purchase of
supplies.54

Some commentators have read the Court’s argument regarding
48. 80 F. 712 (6th Cir. 1897).
49. Id. at 721 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 876(a) (1939) (“For harm resulting to a third person
from the tortious conduct of another, a person is liable if he . . . orders or induces such conduct,
knowing of the conditions under which the act is done or intending the consequences which ensue
. . . .”); see also id. § 876(b) (indicating that although knowledge of the legal duty may be sufficient
to meet the scienter requirement, it is not the sole way to do so).
52. 207 U.S. 196 (1907).
53. See id. at 198–99 (explaining that the machine was sold subject to a license displayed on the
machine that required that paper, ink, and all other supplies used with the machine be made by the
Neostyle Company and that defendant company sold its ink to the owners of the Neostyle machine).
54. Id. at 200.
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notification “by the plaintiffs of the [patent] rights” as requiring
knowledge of the patent for indirect infringement.55 However, this
interpretation is unsubstantiated. First, the accused infringers in
Cortelyou had no “knowledge of the special character of the rotary
Neostyle machine,” which is the essential scienter element for indirect
infringement.56 In this regard, if the patentee had put the accused
infringers on direct notice of the patent, they would have had such
knowledge. Thus, while knowledge of the patent may be sufficient to
meet the scienter requirement, it is not necessary.57 Second, knowledge
of the patent would be relevant for a finding of inducement of breach of
contract, as the contract included a license of the patent. Because the
Court did not separately address each claim in the quoted passage, it
could have simply been referring to the contract claim in its discussion of
“the [patent] rights.”58 Thus, Cortelyou should not be read as implicitly
endorsing any sort of knowledge-of-the-patent requirement, particularly
given the Court’s express statements otherwise in American Cotton-Tie
and Morgan Envelope.
In 1909, in Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co.,59 the
Supreme Court found Leeds liable for contributory infringement for
selling a component of Victor’s patented invention to Victor’s customers
(namely, a record for use in Victor’s patented machine). Although the
Court only briefly remarked upon the scienter requirements for
contributory infringement, its discussion in no manner deviated from
earlier doctrine that knowledge of the patent is not an element of this
requirement.60
The Supreme Court next addressed the rule in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.

55. See, e.g., Brief for Business Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
18, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) (No. 10-6), 2010 WL
4973150, at *17 (“[T]here must be proof that the defendant ‘actually knew [of] the existence of the
complainant’s patent.’” (citing Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200, 202–05 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1898)); Brief for Comcast Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, GlobalTech, 131 S. Ct. 2060 (No. 10-6), 2010 WL 4973147, at *14 (“Congress required actual knowledge
of infringement as an element of liability . . . .”).
56. Cortelyou, 207 U.S. at 200.
57. Cf. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1939) (stating that knowledge of the legal
duty binding the direct tortfeasor is sufficient, but not necessary, for a finding of scienter on the
part of the indirect tortfeasor).
58. Cortelyou, 207 U.S. at 199–200.
59. 213 U.S. 325 (1909).
60. See id. at 332–34 (discussing knowledge and intent with respect to the end-use of Leeds’
records in the patented machines, but never considering whether Leeds had knowledge of the
patent-at-issue); id. at 337 (“Petitioner was found guilty of selling records which constituted an
element in the combination of the patent in suit, and for that petitioner was punished.”).
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in 1912.61 Contrary to its prior holdings, the Court stated in A.B. Dick
without citation that “if the defendants [accused of contributory
infringement] knew of the patent and that [the direct infringer] had
unlawfully made the patented article . . . with the intent and purpose that
[the direct infringer] should use the infringing article . . . they would assist
in her infringing use.”62 This is the only statement by the Supreme
Court—or any lower court cited with approval by the Court—that actual
knowledge of the patent is a pre-requisite to a finding of indirect
infringement. However, in A.B. Dick, knowledge of the patent was not
in dispute, and the Court provided no analysis to support its contention
that actual knowledge was relevant. Indeed, the Court went on to cite
Thomson-Houston I, which as noted earlier, did not require actual
knowledge of the patent to support a finding of indirect infringement.63
Rather, the A.B. Dick court appeared to misread the use of the phrase
“patented invention” in Thomson-Houston I as requiring knowledge of
the patent.64 Thus, the statement in A.B. Dick should be viewed as one
line of aberrant and unsupported dicta in a sea of otherwise consistent
holdings from the Supreme Court. Indeed, in the years following A.B.
Dick, lower courts continued to hold that knowledge of the patent was not
a requirement for indirect infringement (and it does not appear that any
court followed the mistaken dicta in A.B. Dick).65
61. 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled on other grounds by Motion Picture Patent Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Just one year earlier, the Court briefly addressed contributory
infringement in the context of copyright law. See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63
(1911) (citing Morgan-Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 433
(1894), with approval).
62. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 33 (emphasis added).
63. The Court also approvingly cited a number of other cases in A.B. Dick, none of which
adopted a knowledge-of-the-patent requirement. See id. at 33–34 (citing Wallace v. Holmes,
Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Trent, Thomson-Houston II, and American Graphophone Co.
v. Hawthorne).
64. See id. at 33 (quoting Thomson-Houston I, 72 F. 1016, 1017 (C.C. Conn. 1896)). Kumar
offers an alternative interpretation—mainly that the Court merely set forth a sufficient, but not a
necessary, condition for scienter in A.B. Dick. Kumar, supra note 17, at 738–39. In his view,
“[b]ecause a finding of knowledge automatically implies the defendant’s intent to cause the acts
that subsequently constitute infringement, this finding satisfies the requirement set forth in
Wallace.” Id. at 738. Such a view is certainly consistent with the law of torts, see supra note 51
and accompanying text, and is perhaps the only way to reconcile the Court’s citation in A.B. Dick
of Wallace and other cases, but it seems the Court would have stated the broader rule, rather than
merely a sufficient condition for meeting the scienter standard. In any event, whether the statement
is mistaken dicta or merely the recitation of a narrow sufficient condition, it clearly does not instate
any sort of binding knowledge-of-the-patent requirement.
65. See, e.g., N.Y. Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 (8th Cir. 1915) (hoisting devices
and frames); Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gould Coupler Co., 229 F. 429, 443–44
(W.D.N.Y. 1916) (electric car-lighting systems); Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Errett, 300 F. 955,
960 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (Learned Hand, J.) (beverage dispenser); Wilson v. Union Tool Co., 265 F.
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Following A.B. Dick, in a line of cases culminating in 1944 with
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co.,66 the Supreme Court greatly
narrowed the applicability of indirect infringement. Specifically, it held
that the sale of unpatented material cannot constitute indirect
infringement, even “where the unpatented material or device is itself an
integral part of the structure embodying the patent,” because to allow as
much would run afoul of the antitrust laws.67 This ruling essentially left
indirect infringement a dead letter.
II. SCIENTER FOR INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT AFTER THE PATENT ACT OF
1952
In response to the Court’s decision in Mercoid, Congress decided in
the Patent Act of 1952 to reinstate the law of indirect infringement by
codifying precedent as it existed prior to Mercoid.68 This Part begins by
discussing that codification and shows that Congress did not intend to
deviate from the historical practice that knowledge of the patent was not
required.69 Then, this Part explains how the Court bungled its reading of
669, 672 (9th Cir. 1920) (underreamers); Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Errett, 297 F. 733, 734–
35 (2d Cir. 1924) (beverage dispenser); Lenk v. Hunt-Lasher Co., 14 F.2d 335, 337 (D. Mass. 1926)
(automatic blow torches); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Precise Mfg. Corp., 11 F.2d 209, 210
(2d Cir. 1926) (transformers); Electro Bleaching Gas Co. v. Paradon Eng’g Co., 12 F.2d 511, 513
(2d Cir. 1926) (water sterilization process); Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Ready Auto Supply Co., 22 F.2d
331, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 1927) (lubricating apparatus); Nat’l Brake & Elec. Co. v. Christensen, 38 F.2d
721, 723 (7th Cir. 1930) (repair parts); Trico Prods. Corp. v. Apco-Mossberg Corp., 45 F.2d 594,
599 (1st Cir. 1930) (windshield wipers); Am. Voting Mach. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 2 F. Supp. 191,
192 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (voting machine); Chas. H. Lilly Co. v. I.F. Laucks, Inc., 68 F.2d 175, 189
(9th Cir. 1933) (adhesive product); Autographic Register Co. v. Sturgis Register Co., 110 F.2d 883,
885 (6th Cir. 1940) (paper feed device). See generally 3 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS 1764–
65 (1937) (citing cases).
66. 320 U.S. 661 (1944). Previous cases addressing the issue include Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp.,
283 U.S. 27 (1931), Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938), and B.B. Chem. Co. v.
Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942).
67. Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 665. Concurring, Justice Black noted that contributory infringement
had no statutory basis, and argued that “[i]nstead, the chief reliance [of Justice Frankfurter’s dissent
in favor of the doctrine] appears to be upon the law of torts, a quotation from a decision of a lower
federal court which held that no infringement was shown, and the writer’s personal views on
‘morals’ and ‘ethics’”—all reflections of the common law lineage of the doctrine. Id. at 673 (Black,
J., concurring).
68. See generally Hymen Diamond, The Status of Combination Patents Owned by Sellers of an
Element of the Combination, 21 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 843, 849–50 (1939) (discussing the case law
prior to Mercoid); see also Giles S. Rich, Contributory Infringement, 14 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 376
(1932) (same).
69. See infra Part II.A; see also Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 813 (1989)
(“When Congress codifies a judicially defined concept, it is presumed, absent an express statement
to the contrary, that Congress intended to adopt the interpretation placed on that concept by the
courts.”).
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this precedent, not just once, but twice, in Aro II and Global-Tech, so as
to instate a completely opposite doctrine.70
A. The Legislative History of the 1952 Act Demonstrates Congress
Intended No Change in Scienter Standards from Pre-1952 Doctrine
The Patent Act of 1952 codified the historical precedents in sections
271(b) and 271(c), other than the Court’s holdings in the series of
opinions culminating in Mercoid, so as to effectively overrule them.71
Specifically, Congress intended section 271(c) to codify those cases
relating to the sale of a component of an infringing combination and
section 271(b) to codify those cases relating to general aiding and
abetting of direct infringement.72
The legislative history of the 1952 Act does not in any manner show
intent by Congress to impose a “knowledge of the patent” requirement
onto sections 271(b) or 271(c). Although the legislative history notes that
indirect infringement “has been applied to enjoin those who sought to
70. See infra Part II.B–C.
71. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012) (explaining why a patent owner entitled to relief for
infringement shall not be otherwise deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of a patent by
enforcing patent rights for contributory infringement); Dawson Chem. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448
U.S. 176, 198–212 (1980) (recounting the effort to resurrect the doctrine of contributory
infringement in the Patent Act of 1952); S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 8, 28 (1952) (stating this
amendment was meant to “eliminate the doubt and confusion” created by “a number of decisions
of the courts in recent years”); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952) (same); see also Charles W.
Adams, supra note 16, at 384–89 (same); Note, Section 271(b) of The Patent Act of 1952:
Confusion Codified, 66 YALE L.J. 132, 139 (1956) (same). With respect to the misuse issue,
Representative Rogers aptly summed up Congress’s intent:
Then in effect this recodification, particularly as to section 231 [which became § 271 in
the Patent Code of 1952], would point out to the court, at least that it was the sense of
Congress that we remove this question of confusion as to whether contributory
infringement existed at all, and state in positive law that there is such a thing as
contributory infringement, or at least it be the sense of Congress by the enactment of this
law that if you have in the Mercoid case [320 U.S. 661, 680, 64 S.Ct. 268, 278, 88 L.Ed.
376] done away with contributory infringement, then we reinstate it as a matter of
substantive law of the United States and that you shall hereafter in a proper case
recognize or hold liable one who has contributed to the infringement of a patent.
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 3760, 82d Cong. 159
(1951) (Testimony of Representative Rogers), quoted in Aro II, 377 U.S. 476, 485 n.6 (1964)
(alterations in original).
72. See Aro II, 377 U.S. at 485 n.6 (“[S]ection [271(c)] was designed to ‘codify in statutory
form principles of contributory infringement’ which had been ‘part of our law for about 80 years.”);
S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 22 (“One who actively induces infringement as by aiding and abetting the
same is liable as an infringer . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (“[O]ne who aids and abets an
infringement is likewise an infringer . . . .”); CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04[2] (2010) (“[The]
legislative history indicates that the two sections were intended as complementary provisions,
together codifying the basic principles of contributory infringement developed by the courts before
1952.”).
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cause infringement by supplying someone else with the means and
directions for infringing a patent,”73 this language is no less ambiguous
than that of section 271(b) (“actively induces infringement”). Indeed, the
legislative history goes on to note that “[p]aragraph (b) recites in broad
terms that one who aids and abets an infringement is likewise an
infringer.”74
This and other portions of the legislative history confirm the
understanding that sections 271(b) and 271(c) codified the historical
precedent, which—relying on the same principles as the common law of
torts—did not require any knowledge of the legal duty (i.e., patent) at
issue, but merely required specific intent to encourage the direct
infringer’s acts.75 Perhaps the most convincing evidence of Congress’s
intent is the testimony of Giles Rich—then a practicing attorney who
played a key role in drafting the 1952 Act, and later Chief Judge of the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Federal Circuit.76 In his
words, “‘knowingly sells a component of a patented machine’ means to
us that you know that the component is going into that machine. You
don’t have to know that it is patented.”77 In sum, in adopting sections
271(b) and 271(c), there is no indication whatsoever that Congress
desired to deviate from the pre-1952 scienter standard that knowledge of
the patent was not required for a finding of indirect infringement.
B. Revisionism Part I in Aro II
As discussed at length in Part I—other than one line of aberrant
dicta78—prior to the 1952 Act, knowledge of the patent was consistently
held by the Supreme Court not to be a prerequisite for a finding of
contributory infringement. However, a little over a decade later in Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II),79 the Supreme
Court held otherwise in a 5–4 decision regarding the 1952 Act’s
codification of contributory infringement in section 271(c).80 The
73. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 6 (emphasis added).
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. See id. at 22 (“One who actively induces infringement as by aiding and abetting the same is
liable as an infringer”).
76. See Adams, supra note 16, at 387 n.65 (“Judge Rich’s insights with respect to 35 U.S.C. §
271 are especially significant because of his prominent role in its enactment.”).
77. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (further quoting Rich’s congressional
testimony). Although Judge Rich was referring to a version of the statute that was later amended,
as explained below, the amendment had no material effect on his interpretation.
78. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text (explaining that, prior to 1952, contributory
infringement did not require actual knowledge of the patent at issue).
79. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
80. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, Clark, and White held this view. Justices
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remainder of this Section recounts the holding and reasoning of the
majority opinion, explaining its faults in detail, particularly in the context
of the arguments lodged by the dissenting Justices.
First, it is important to recognize that all of the Justices agreed that:
In enacting § 271(c), Congress clearly succeeded in its objective of
codifying this case law. The language of the section fits perfectly Aro’s
activity of selling “a component of a patented * * * combination * * *,
constituting a material part of the invention, * * * especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use.” Indeed, this is the almost unique case in which the
component was hardly suitable for any noninfringing use. On this basis
both the District Court originally, and the Court of Appeals in the
instant case, held that Aro was a contributory infringer within the
precise letter of § 271(c).81

Thus, the Justices seemingly agreed that section 271(c) succeeded in
codifying the pre-1952 elements for contributory infringement, which as
explained above, contained no knowledge-of-the-patent requirement
under any legitimate reading of the case law.82 Indeed, in a footnote, the
Court appeared to acknowledge as much, stating “Aro’s factory manager
admitted that the fabric replacements in question not only were specially
designed for the Ford convertibles but would not, to his knowledge, fit
the top-structures of any other cars.”83 This factual finding, upon which
the district and circuit courts based their holdings, had no relationship
whatsoever to whether Aro knew of the patent-at-issue.
Nonetheless, the majority effectively questioned whether Congress
actually intended to codify pre-1952 case law:
However, the language of § 271(c) presents a question, apparently not
noticed by the parties or the courts below, concerning the element of
knowledge that must be brought home to Aro before liability can be
imposed. It is only sale of a component of a patented combination
“knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use

Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, and Goldberg dissented on the issue. Id. at 482 n.8. Notably, Justices
Black and Douglas had previously voted in Mercoid to effectively eliminate the doctrine of indirect
infringement. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 661–62, 672 (1944).
Indeed, Justice Douglas wrote the opinion of the majority and Justice Black wrote a concurring
opinion. See id. None of the other Justices on the Aro II Court were on the Mercoid Court. See
Justices of the United States Supreme Court, THE GREEN PAPERS, http://www.thegreenpapers.com
/Hx/JusticesUSSC.html (last visited July 7, 2013) (listing all Justices of the United States Supreme
Court by term).
81. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 487–88 (ellipses in original) (footnotes and citations omitted).
82. See supra Part I.
83. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 487–88 n.7.
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in an infringement of such patent” that is contributory infringement
under the statute. Was Aro “knowing” within the statutory meaning
because—as it admits, and as the lower courts found—it knew that its
replacement fabrics were especially designed for use in the 1952–1954
Ford convertible tops and were not suitable for other use? Or does the
statute require a further showing that Aro knew that the tops were
patented, and knew also that Ford was not licensed under the patent so
that any fabric replacement by a Ford car owner constituted
infringement?84

Thus, the majority read the specific language of section 271(c) as
posing a question not present in the pre-1952 case law (which is almost
certainly why neither the parties nor the lower courts recognized it):
whether knowledge of the patent is a (new) requirement imposed by
Congress in the 1952 Act for contributory infringement arising from the
sale of a component especially adapted for use in an infringing product
under section 271(c).
In holding that Congress did intend to impose such a requirement, the
majority essentially relied on the opinion of Justice Black,85 who voted a
few decades earlier in Mercoid to jettison the entire doctrine of indirect
infringement because it had no statutory basis.86 Justice Black reasoned
that:
Usually the word “knowing” means “knowing,” and I am unwilling to
say that in § 271(c) it means “unknowing.” This statute to me means
rather plainly that in order to violate it, one who sells an article must
know that the article is to be used “in an infringement of such patent”
and that it is “especially made or especially adapted” for that purpose.87

Justice Black also argued that the legislative history supported his
view. Specifically, he noted that section 271(c) had originally been
drafted as follows:
Whoever knowingly sells a component of a patented * * * combination *
* * especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of
such patent * * * shall be liable as a contributory infringer.88

Congress ultimately adopted the following language:
84. Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
85. See id. at 488 n.8 (identifying the way each member of the Court voted and summarizing
the opinion of the dissenters). Although the majority also stated that it relied on the concurring
opinion of Justice White, since the only reasons he explicitly provided, see id. at 514 (White, J.,
concurring), were duplicative of Justice Black’s much more detailed opinion, see id. at 528–29
(Black, J., dissenting from the judgment but commanding a majority on the scienter issue), only
Justice Black’s opinion is addressed here.
86. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
87. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 525.
88. Id. (emphasis added) (citing H.R. 3760, 82d Cong., § 231(c) (1951)).
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Whoever sells . . . a component of a patented . . . combination . . . ,
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use
in an infringement of such patent . . . shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.89

Justice Black interpreted the change as requiring knowledge that the
component would be used for an infringing activity—that is, knowledge
of the patent and its contents. He based his finding on several arguments,
none of which is convincing. First, Justice Black noted that the original
position of the word “knowingly” led some commentators to argue that
“it was not clear exactly how much a person had to be shown to have
known before he could be held liable as a contributory infringer.” 90
Relying on congressional testimony, Justice Black concluded that
Congress adopted the recommendation of some of those testifying that a
contributory infringer must “know of the existence of [the] patent.”91
Justice Black’s conclusion, however, is supported by neither the
testimony nor the legislative history. Contrary to Justice Black’s view,
there are three potential interpretations of the original language: (1) the
seller need only know that it is making a sale, but need not know of the
sale’s end use or know of the patent-at-issue; (2) the seller must know it
is making a sale and know of its end use, but need not know of the patent;
and (3) the seller must know of all three elements. Justice Black, on the
other hand, wrongly assumed that the original language could only mean
either interpretation (1) or (3).
Thus, in moving “knowing,” Congress could—as a mere matter of
statutory interpretation—have intended interpretation (2), which does not
require knowledge of the patent. Indeed, in addition to historical practice
and the legislative history, the testimony relied upon by Justice Black
actually supports this interpretation.92 As Justice Black himself remarked
89. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1952) (emphasis added).
90. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 525 (citing Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R.
3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 215 (1951)).
91. Id. at 526.
92. See generally Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm and Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 204 (1980) (noting
that the Court “regard[s] each set of hearings as relevant to a full understanding of the final
legislative product” encompassing sections 271(a)–(d) of the Patent Act of 1952). Relatedly,
Justice Black also argued that the statement in the legislative history that “[t]his latter paragraph
[of section 271(c)] is much more restricted than many proponents of contributory infringement
believe should be the case,” supported his interpretation. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 527. This statement
can be rebutted on at least two grounds. First, adoption of interpretation (2) (above) is also
consistent with the legislative history to the extent it also restricts one of the interpretations of the
original language. See H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952) (clarifying that section 271 declares
what constitutes infringement, codifies in statutory form the principles of contributory
infringement, and eliminates doubt and confusion); S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 8 (1952) (same). And
while Judge Giles Rich expressed a view consistent with interpretation (2) prior to the amendment,
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in a footnote regarding an exchange in a Congressional hearing prior to
the amendment:
When a witness from the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
raised the same objection, the following exchange took place:
‘(Congressman) BRYSON. It seems to me that if he sells it at all he
knows he sells it.
‘Mr. FUGATE (of the Justice Department). He knows he sells it; but,
as in this case that I mentioned, the cutter of the metal plate according
to a special pattern didn’t know that it was to be used in an infringing
manner, that it was to be used in a patented combination.
‘(Congressman) ROGERS. Inasmuch as you recognize that the law still
gives a cause of action against the contributor who helps infringe, would
there be any objection on the part of the Justice Department to clarify
that law in definite words so that there would not be the confusion that
the gentlemen have testified to?’93

Although the Justice Department representative used the phrases
“infringing manner” and “patented combination” in his testimony, he
arguably meant “manner that happens to infringe” and “combination that
happens to be patented”—rather than knowledge of the patent—because
Representative Rogers began with the question concerning knowledge of
the sale itself, as contrasted with knowledge of the end use of the sale.
Thus, Justice Black ostensibly made an interpretative mistake in viewing
this exchange as supporting his broad interpretation of “knowingly” in
the statute.94
see infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text, others—such as Representative Bryson—expressed
a view that the pre-amendment language could simply imply interpretation (1). Second, the above
statement cited by Justice Black may have nothing to do with scienter standards, but instead a
compromise regarding other aspects of section 271(c). For example, in Dawson Chemical, the
Court noted:
[Giles] Rich warned against going too far [with the contributory infringement provision].
He took the position that a law designed to reinstate the broad contributory infringement
reasoning of Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), “would kill itself in time.” The
proposed legislation, however, “stopped short of that” and “said that you can control
only things like the switches in the Mercoid case, which are especially made or adapted
for use in connection with such patent and which are not suitable for actual, commercial,
noninfringing use.”
Dawson Chemical, 448 U.S. at 208 (citations omitted).
93. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 526 n.10; see also Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on
H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 175 (1951)
(statement of Rep. Crumpacker) (objecting to the original language because “the way it is phrased
the word ‘knowingly’ refers directly to the word ‘sells’”).
94. Gonzales makes essentially the same set of interpretative errors as Justice Black in her recent
article arguing that the legislative history supports a knowledge-of-the-patent requirement. See
Gonzales, supra note 17, at 62–66 (comparing the 1948 original proposed language against the
language used in the current version of section 271 and mistakenly arguing that Congress’s intent
when it enacted section 271 was to protect the interest of commerce, requiring it to narrow the
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Further evidence of Justice Black’s interpretative error is provided by
Judge Giles S. Rich—then a practicing patent lawyer, who was one of the
primary drafters of the Patent Act of 1952. In his testimony prior to the
amendment, Judge Rich interpreted the provision as follows:
‘[K]nowingly sells a component of a patented machine’ means to us
that you know that the component is going into that machine. You don’t
have to know that it is patented. You don’t have to know the number
of the patent, and you don’t have to know that the machine that it is
going into constitutes an infringement. You just know its ultimate
destination.’95

Judge Rich testified similarly later in the hearing:
‘Mr. Fugate. I would like to know whether Mr. Rich is construing
“knowingly” as meaning that the supplier knows that it is to be used in
an infringing manner.
‘Mr. Rogers. And constitutes a material part of the patent.
‘Mr. Fugate. Yes, that is the point.
‘Mr. Rich. I have already explained that he knows how it is to be used.
He doesn’t have to know about the patent, he doesn’t have to be legally
advised of that infringement.’96

Thus, based on the testimony of Giles Rich, arguably the most
appropriate interpretation is that “knowingly” was moved within section
271(c) simply to clarify that this modifier referred to the knowledge that
the component was “especially adapted” rather than knowledge that a sale
itself was being made.97
Second, Justice Black argued that “[i]t is hard to believe that Congress
intended to hold persons liable for acts which they had no reason to
suspect were unlawful.”98 Yet, this argument could just as easily apply

original proposed language so that only those who had knowledge of the patent would be found
liable under section 271).
95. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 526 n.11.
96. Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 175–76 (1951); see also Freedman v. Friedman, 242
F.2d 364, 367 (4th Cir. 1957) (reviewing the same legislative history and concluding “[t]here is no
indication of any intent to make knowledge that there was a patent and that it was being infringed
necessary to liability for contributory infringement”).
97. Notably, Judge Rich authored the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Hewlett-Packard v. Bausch
& Lomb, which held that knowledge of the patent was not necessary for a finding of induced
infringement. See Hewlett-Packard v. Bausch & Lomb, 909 F.2d 1464, 1468–70 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Unfortunately, although that opinion contains some discussion of the relevant historical case law,
it does not canvass the cases or legislative history in a comprehensive manner, much less discuss
Judge Rich’s role in the drafting the 1952 Act and his contemporaneous views of the relevant
statutory language. See id.
98. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 527.
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to direct infringement, which effectively sounds in strict liability, 99
relying upon a theory of constructive notice from the publication of
patents.100 Although Justice Black argued that “one who sells an
unpatented and unpatentable” product without actual knowledge of the
patent should not be held liable,101 he overlooked that contributory
infringement, as historically applied, merely required knowledge that the
infringing component was especially adapted for use in the very
combination that happened to infringe the patent-at-issue. Because
Congress meant to codify pre-1952 law, Justice Black was simply
incorrect when it came to surmising Congress’s intent regarding
knowledge of the patent.
Third, Justice Black argued that 35 U.S.C. § 287, which states that “no
damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for
infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the
infringement and continued to infringe thereafter,” precludes damages in
the absence of knowledge of the patent.102 Yet, as the dissenters rightly
noted, section 287 is merely relevant to marking and provides a defense
to any accused infringer against pre-suit damages in the event the
patentee did not properly mark its products.103 Section 287 does not
impose a blanket “actual notice” requirement to recover damages.104
Critically, section 287 has never been read—before or after Aro II—to
eliminate all liability for patent infringement for lack of actual notice.105
Rather, regardless of notice, infringers are always potentially liable for
99. To be certain, Justice Black did argue that section 287 imposed a knowledge-of-the-patent
requirement for direct infringement, at least for “innocent consumers of patented products.” Id. at
529. For the reasons presented below, such an argument was meritless. See infra notes 102–05
and accompanying text.
100. See Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Nat’l Nut Co., 310 U.S. 281, 295 (1940) (finding that
publication of a patent provides “implied knowledge of the . . . patent”); Howson, supra note 14,
at 174–75 (“The publication of patents is assumed in law to be sufficient notice to the public of
their existence.”).
101. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 527–29.
102. See id. at 527–28 (arguing it would be “hard to believe that Congress intended to hold
persons liable for acts which they had no reason to suspect were unlawful”).
103. See Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 395 (1936) (noting
that marking provides notice of a patent to others).
104. See id. at 398 (“[T]he act of 1861 did not require a patentee who did not produce to give
actual notice to an infringer before damages could be recovered; and there is nothing in the language
or history of the act of 1870 sufficient to indicate an intent to alter his position in this regard.”).
105. See Aro II, 377 U.S. at 488 n.8 (majority opinion on the judgment but dissenting on the
scienter issue) (citing DELLER, supra note 65, § 453) (“To constitute an infringement of a patent, it
is not necessary that the infringer should have known of the existence of the patent at the time he
infringed it or, knowing of its existence, it is not necessary that he should have known his doings
to constitute an infringement.”); see also Sontag Chain Stores, 310 U.S. at 295 (finding that patent
publication provides constructive notice).
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post-suit damages and the possibility of injunctive relief. Yet, in Aro II,
Justice Black completely misread the provision as precluding not just presuit damages, but all forms of liability in the absence of knowledge of the
patent.106 Thus, section 287 cannot support a knowledge-of-the-patent
requirement.
Last, Justice Black argued on policy grounds that without a
knowledge-of-the-patent requirement, there would be a “tremendous
burden” placed on “bona fide dealers in or purchasers of unpatented
products.”107 Specifically, Justice Black indicated that because the
number of patents covering products—for instance, automobiles—is very
large, searching to determine if a particular patent was infringed would
be needlessly costly and difficult.108 Although these arguments may have
some merit,109 obviously they cannot override the intent of Congress to
codify prior case law.110 Indeed, although Justice Black pegged his
interpretation of section 271(c) on Congress’s purported attempt to
modify the common law by moving the term “knowing,” he failed to
reconcile his misguided view in any manner with Congress’s clear aim in
the legislative history to codify prior case law.
The four Justices dissenting from Justice Black’s views made
arguments consistent with the text of the statute, historical practice, and
the legislative history in finding that all “Congress meant to require was
simply knowledge that the component was especially designed for use in
a combination and was not a staple article suitable for substantial other
use, and not knowledge that the combination was either patented or

106. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 528–29 (Black, J., dissenting from the judgment).
107. Id. at 529.
108. See id.
109. The aim of this Essay is not to discuss the policy rationales in favor or against the outcomes
in Aro II and Global-Tech, as they should have played no role in the outcome of the case given the
clear intent of Congress to codify historical precedent. For a discussion of the various policy
rationales animating the Court’s opinions, see Sichelman, supra note 17.
110. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 407 (2006) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“[W]e have an overriding duty to obey statutory commands that unambiguously
express the intent of Congress . . . .”). Gonzales argues that Congress evidenced its intent to
generally protect industry in the legislative history, which—along with the statutory amendments
discussed above—should be viewed as congressional intent to adopt a knowledge-of-the-patent
requirement. See Gonzales, supra note 17, at 61 (noting the argument made by Angier L. Goodwin,
a member of the subcommittee, who stated he wanted the legislation to avoid requiring every
business to be “on notice” that every move it made could be an infringement). Yet, vague
statements evincing support for industry certainly cannot override Congress’s clear intent to codify
statutory case law. Indeed, whether a knowledge-of-the-patent requirement hurts or helps industry
is a contentious policy question. See supra note 16 (citing numerous conflicting scholarly
approaches).
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infringing.”111 They made four arguments in support of this conclusion.
First, the dissenters noted that to hold otherwise would contravene
Congress’s intention “to codify the case law of contributory infringement
as it existed” historically.112 These Justices properly recognized that
“[u]nder that case law, liability was established by a showing that the
component was suitable for no substantial use other than in the patented
combination,” that is, in the combination that happened to be patented,
regardless of the infringer’s knowledge of the patent.113 Second, as
argued earlier,114 these Justices found that the
[c]hange in the language of the bill concerning the knowledge
requirement . . . was intended merely to assure that the statute would be
construed to require knowledge that the article sold was a component
of some combination and was especially designed for use therein, rather
than simply knowledge that the article was being sold.115

The Justices further noted that “none of the Congressmen said anything
to indicate agreement with these views [that knowledge of the patent
should be required] or disagreement with the contrary view expressed by
the spokesman for the sponsors of the bill.”116 Third, they explained that
Justice Black’s argument that no infringement—direct or indirect—could
be found absent knowledge of the patent contradicted the plain language
of section 271(a) governing direct infringement.117 Moreover, such a
view contravened pre-1952 black-letter doctrine that direct infringement
is a strict liability offense.118 Fourth, these Justices rightly rebutted
Justice
Black’s
contention
that
section
287
regarding marking and notice mandated a knowledge-of-the-patent
requirement.119 Specifically, they argued, section 287
prevents a patentee from recovering damages for infringement unless
he has marked the patented article with notice of the patent. Since a
111. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 488 n.8 (majority opinion on the judgment).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
115. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 488 n.8.
116. Id.
117. See id. (“The suggestion that a person cannot be liable even for direct infringement when
he has no knowledge of the patent or the infringement is clearly refuted by the words of section
271(a).”).
118. See DELLER, supra note 65, § 453 (“To constitute an infringement of a patent, it is not
necessary that the infringer should have known of the existence of the patent at the time he
infringed it or, knowing of its existence, it is not necessary that he should have known his doings
to constitute an infringement.”).
119. See Aro II, 377 U.S. at 488 n.8 (“Since a patentee may hardly be expected to make the
article when it has not been manufactured or sold by him but rather by an infringer, the section has
been held not to apply to such a situation.”).
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patentee may hardly be expected to make the article when it has not
been manufactured or sold by him, but rather by an infringer, the section
has been held not to apply to such a situation.120

For the reasons stated by the four dissenting Justices, as well as the
arguments presented earlier, the majority’s holding in Aro II is clearly
incorrect under any reading of the law. Ultimately, Justice Black’s and
the majority’s legal arguments were meritless, indeed so meritless that
they can rightfully be termed “revisionist.” Granted, Justice Black’s
policy argument grounded on the difficulty of searching for relevant
patents may have some force, but it cannot of course override the intent
of Congress to codify prior precedent.121
C. Revisionism Part II in Global-Tech v. SEB
In 2011, in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., in an opinion
written by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court continued to misread the
1952 Act by unanimously holding that under section 271(b), inducement
of infringement requires actual knowledge that the inducing acts
constitute patent infringement—or, alternatively, no less than “willful
blindness” thereof.122 The facts of the case are instructive for
understanding the Supreme Court’s analysis.
The plaintiff, a French company, SEB S.A. (“SEB”), held a patent to a
“cool touch” deep fryer that was sold under the popular “T-Fal” brand in
the United States.123 Because SEB’s deep fryer was cooler externally
than competing fryers, and thus safer and easier for home use, it enjoyed
commercial success.124 A U.S. competitor, Sunbeam, desired to
manufacture and sell a “cool touch” fryer, and it contacted a Hong-Kong
company, Pentalpha, to develop one.125 Pentalpha then purchased an
SEB fryer in Hong Kong and, for all but cosmetic features, used it to
construct a deep fryer for Sunbeam.126 The Hong Kong SEB fryer did
not display any U.S. patent markings.127
Pentalpha then hired a patent attorney to conduct a freedom-to-operate
120. Id.
121. In another article, I also find Justice Black’s policy arguments ultimately unconvincing,
mainly because there is scant reliable empirical evidence to support his claims. See Sichelman,
supra note 109.
122. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011). Justice Kennedy
filed a dissent based on other grounds. See id. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that willful
blindness should not suffice for knowledge).
123. Id. at 2064 (majority opinion).
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
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analysis to determine whether the fryer was infringing any U.S.
patents.128 However, Pentalpha did not inform the patent attorney that it
had developed the fryer’s design directly from its study of SEB’s fryer.129
The attorney never discovered SEB’s patent and ultimately issued an
opinion letter advising Pentalpha that it was able to manufacture its deep
fryer without infringing any identified U.S. patents.130 Pentalpha began
selling its deep fryer to Sunbeam in 1997, causing SEB to lose market
share and sales.131 In March 1998, SEB sued Sunbeam for patent
infringement.132 Despite the lawsuit, Pentalpha continued to sell its
fryers to other customers.133 SEB and Sunbeam settled their lawsuit, and
SEB went on to sue Pentalpha for direct infringement under section
271(a) and induced infringement under section 271(b).134
The ensuing jury trial found for SEB under both section 271(a) for
direct infringement and section 271(b) for indirect infringement.135
Pentalpha appealed to the Federal Circuit on both findings. 136 For
complex procedural reasons related to the jury instructions, the Federal
Circuit found that it was necessary to affirm both on the direct and
inducement claims for Pentalpha to be held liable for infringement.137
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit affirmed on both grounds, holding in
relevant part that induced infringement under section 271(b) requires that
(1) the alleged infringer knew or should have known that its actions
would induce actual infringement of a patent and (2) the alleged infringer
had knowledge of such patent.138 Although there was no evidence on
record that Pentalpha actually knew of SEB’s patent before April 1998,
the Federal Circuit found adequate evidence that “Pentalpha deliberately
disregarded a known risk that SEB had a protective patent.”139
According to the Federal Circuit, this deliberate disregard amounted to a
form of “actual knowledge.”140 Upon Pentalpha’s petition, the Supreme
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating
the jury verdict form “reveal[ed] a hopeless ambiguity,” such that the court could not determine
which elements were crucial to the jury’s decision).
138. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2064–65.
139. Id. at 2065 (citing SEB, 594 F.3d at 1377).
140. Id.
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Court granted certiorari.141
The Court began its analysis with the text of section 271(b): “Whoever
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
infringer.”142 As in Aro II, regarding section 271(c), the Court in GlobalTech found the language of section 271(b) “ambiguous”:
In referring to a party that “induces infringement,” this provision may
require merely that the inducer lead another to engage in conduct that
happens to amount to infringement, i.e., the making, using, offering to
sell, selling, or importing of a patented invention. . . . On the other hand,
the reference to a party that “induces infringement” may also be read to
mean that inducer must persuade another to engage in conduct that the
inducer knows is infringement. Both readings are possible.143

Because the statutory language was ambiguous, the Court then
examined the case law in effect prior to the enactment of the 1952 Act,
properly recognizing that “section [271(b)] was designed to codify in
statutory form principles of contributory infringement which had been
part of our law for about [eighty] years.”144
1.

The Court’s Arguably Obfuscatory Analysis of the Pre-1952 Case
Law
Although the Court’s reasoning through this point in its opinion was
flawless, it would soon take a sharp turn in the opposite direction. The
first major flaw was the Court’s quite mistaken view that the pre-1952
case law was “less clear than one might hope . . . provid[ing] conflicting
signals regarding the intent needed in such cases.”145 The Court began
its review of the case law by recounting the opinion of then-Judge Taft in
Thomson-Houston II that it was “sufficient if the seller of the component
part intended that the part be used in an invention that happened to
infringe a patent.”146 In a corresponding footnote, the Court cited the
contemporaneous scholarly article by Howson mentioned earlier that
summarized the case law as clearly not requiring knowledge of the
patent-at-issue to meet the scienter requirement for indirect
infringement.147
The Court included in the same footnote a list of “other authorities
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2066 (quoting Aro II, 377 U.S. 476, 485–86 (1964) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923,
at 9 (1952))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2066 n.3 (citing Howson, supra note 14, at 9).
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from this era [that] likewise suggest” the same rule, oddly including its
holding in Morgan Envelope.148 Recall that in this case the Court
remarked that knowledge of the patent is not an essential element of
scienter for indirect infringement, stating “that the manufacture and sale
of a single element of a combination, with the intent that it shall be united
to the other elements, and so complete the combination, is an
infringement.”149 What is particularly striking about the Court’s
relegation of its own precedent to a footnote is that immediately after its
discussion in the text of then-Judge Taft’s holding in Thomson-Houston
II that knowledge of the patent was not required, the Court described its
apparently contrary statement in Henry v. A.B. Dick without noting that
it was pure dicta.150 The Court then explained that its description in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.151 of pre-1952
contributory infringement cases was in accord with the view of A.B.
Dick.152 In a corresponding footnote, the Court found that its opinion in
Cortelyou “contains language that may be read as adopting a similar
position,” pointing to language in the case that “may suggest that it was
necessary to show that the defendants had notice of [the plaintiff’s] patent
rights.”153 Following this description, the Court cited the singular lower
court holding, Tubular Rivet, that required knowledge of the patent for a
finding of indirect infringement.154 Based on this analysis, the Court
concluded that “the pre-1952 case law that [section 271(b)] was meant to
codify [is] susceptible to conflicting interpretations.”155

148. Id.
149. Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 433
(1894). The Court in Global-Tech also cited several other lower court cases and the treatises by
Deller and Robinson as suggesting the same rule. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066 n.3 (citing
Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Errett, 297 F. 733, 739–40 (2d Cir. 1924); N.Y. Scaffolding Co. v.
Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 (8th Cir. 1915); DELLER, supra note 65, § 507 (same); 3 W. ROBINSON,
THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 924 (1890) (same); Howson, supra note 14).
150. See id. at 2066. Specifically, the Court failed to indicate that the following statement in
A.B. Dick was merely dicta:
[I]f the defendants [who were accused of contributory infringement] knew of the patent
and that [the direct infringer] had unlawfully made the patented article . . . with the intent
and purpose that [the direct infringer] should use the infringing article . . . they would
assist in her infringing use.
Id.
151. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
152. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2067.
153. Id. at 2066 n.4 (citing Cortelyou v. Johnson & Co., 207 U.S. 196, 200 (1907)).
154. See id. at 2067 n.4 (citing Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200, 203 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1898) (“[A] necessary condition of the defendant’s guilt is his knowledge of the
complainant’s patent.”)).
155. Id.
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As Part II shows, the Court’s recounting of pre-1952 case law is sorely
mistaken and arguably obfuscatory. First, the Court completely ignored
its early holding in American Cotton-Tie that knowledge of the patent is
not required for indirect infringement.156 There is simply no mention of
this opinion anywhere in Global-Tech. Although the Court did cite its
subsequent, similar holding in Morgan Envelope, it did so only in a
footnote without any discussion. So when the Court cited its contrary
statement in A.B. Dick in the text of Global-Tech, it made it appear that
there was no contrary Supreme Court precedent. Second, the Court failed
to note that its statement in A.B. Dick was pure dicta.157 Moreover,
although the Court noted that its similar statement in Grokster was
dicta,158 it failed to mention that this statement was premised on no
analysis whatsoever, but rather citations to inconclusive statements in
Federal Circuit and lower court opinions that did not carefully examine
the historical doctrine regarding the appropriate level of scienter for
indirect infringement.159
Thus, if the Court had explicitly discussed its prior on point holdings
in American Cotton-Tie and Morgan Envelope, it would have been
apparent that its dictum in A.B. Dick was of no import in its analysis of
the pre-1952 case law. Similarly, the Court strained to find that its
decision in Cortelyou “may suggest” that knowledge of the patent was
required in the pre-1952 case law.160 As the Court subtly indicated, but
failed to state explicitly, as discussed earlier, there was an alternative
explanation of the relevant language in Cortelyou.161 Finally, its citation
of Tubular Rivet is similarly misplaced—and misleading—because the
Court failed to mention that this opinion was a singular aberration among
a sea of contrary lower court holdings. Indeed, the Tubular Rivet court
premised its statement on a misreading of earlier cases, 162 including
Thomson-Houston II—the opinion written by then-Judge Taft that the
156. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text (explaining in detail that the Court in
American Cotton-Tie did not require knowledge of the patent for a finding of indirect
infringement).
157. Moreover, as Kumar contends, the Court in any event arguably misread A.B. Dick as stating
a necessary—rather than, merely sufficient—requirement for indirect infringement. See Kumar,
supra note 17, at 738–39.
158. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066–67.
159. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005) (citing
Federal Circuit and lower court opinions that provided little to no review of the relevant historical
case law regarding scienter for indirect infringement).
160. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066 n.4.
161. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
162. See Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200, 203 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898) (“All the
cases above cited assert or imply . . . . ”) (discussing Thomson-Houston II earlier in the opinion).
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Court had explained just a few pages earlier squarely held otherwise.163
Taken together, at best, the Court’s analysis is deeply flawed, and at
worst, is pure revisionism—namely, an intentional attempt to obfuscate
the pre-1952 case law. It appears very likely that at least a law clerk
engaged in intentional obfuscation of the pre-1952 case law. First,
whatever clerk likely drafted the opinion was presumably well-aware of
the analysis presented above in Part I, as I submitted it in similar form in
an amicus brief in the case.164 Although many amicus briefs are routinely
ignored, mine was the only one to recount the full pre-1952 case law
history, including citations to then-contemporaneous legal scholarship,
some of which was quite obscure, such as the Howson reference.165
Because the Court’s description of the pre-1952 case law closely tracks
that in my brief, including citations to Howson and other references, it
seems likely that at least a law clerk partially relied on the brief in drafting
the opinion. If so, the law clerk very likely would have been cognizant
of the analysis in Part I.
Second, the errors of omission committed in the Court’s description
are egregious. They include completely ignoring the Court’s first major
holding on the topic, relegating another holding to a footnote, suggesting
that contrary dicta was a square holding, citing dicta from a recent
opinion that contained no analysis, contending that a single line from a
case “suggested” a contrary holding when there was clearly an alternative
explanation casting serious doubt on such a view, and citing the one
aberrant lower court opinion on the issue without discussing the
numerous opinions holding otherwise.
It seems very likely that these mistakes were not unintentional, at least
at the law clerk level. Apparently, sometime after oral argument, the
Court decided on its approach primarily for policy reasons, as neither the
parties’ briefs nor the Federal Circuit’s relevant opinions addressed the
historical case law in any sufficient detail, seemingly leaving a blank slate
upon which the Court could pen any possible outcome. Whatever the
reason, after the case was assigned to Justice Alito, presumably he
delegated responsibility to a law clerk to draft the opinion consonant with
the Court’s desired outcome—namely, to adopt a knowledge-of-thepatent requirement tempered by the doctrine of willful blindness. Given
163. Id. at 202–04.
164. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 17 (describing in detail the case law preceding the
1952 Patent Act).
165. See generally Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotus
blog.com/case-files/cases/global-tech-appliances-inc-v-seb-s-a/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (providing for download all of the filed briefs).
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the astonishing nature of the mistakes made by the Court, it seems
doubtful that any of the Justices read the pre-1952 cases in detail. In the
very least—regardless of whether the Court engaged in intentional
obfuscation through one of Justice Alito’s clerks—the opinion represents
a significant abdication of the Court’s implicit judicial duties to fully
review the relevant case law when forming a decision.166
2. Further Failure to Fully Review Aro II
The Court’s bungling of the case law continued in its subsequent
analysis, which turned to Aro II for guidance given the “conflicting
interpretations” of the pre-1952 case law.167 Like in Aro II,168 the Court
began on the right foot by noting the linguistic ambiguity of the language
of section 271(c).169 As the Court properly recognized:
The phrase “knowing [a component] to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement” may be read to mean that a violator
must know that the component is “especially adapted for use” in a
product that happens to infringe a patent. Or the phrase may be read to
require, in addition, knowledge of the patent’s existence.170

The Court then noted the 5–4 split in Aro II, very briefly recounting
the reasoning of the majority and dissent.171 Without any explicit analysis
of either of the opinions, the Court concluded that:
While there is much to be said in favor of both views expressed in Aro
II, the “holding in Aro II has become a fixture in the law of contributory
infringement under [section] 271(c),” 5 R. Moy, Walker on Patents §
15:20, p. 15–131 (4th ed. 2009)—so much so that SEB has not asked us
to overrule it . . . . Nor has Congress seen fit to alter § 271(c)’s intent
requirement in the nearly half a century since Aro II was decided. In
166. See Graham Cnty. Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559
U.S. 280, 298 (2010) (noting the “‘judicial duty to give faithful meaning to the language Congress
adopted in the light of the evident legislative purpose in enacting the law in question’” (quoting
United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 310 (1976))); Samuel P. Jordan, Irregular Panels, 60
ALA. L. REV. 547, 577 n.124 (describing the appellate process as one in which “each judge is
expected to read the briefs and cases necessary to participate meaningfully in the decisional
process”); cf. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 130 S. Ct. 2433, 2449 (2010)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court contorts the statute and our cases, misreads the statutory
history, and ascribes to Congress a series of policy choices that Congress manifestly did not
make.”); Robert A. Leflar, The Multi-Judge Decisional Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 722, 723 (1983)
(“Knowledge that multiple judges check each other helps to sustain confidence and to protect
individual judges from public criticism.”).
167. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2067 (2011).
168. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
169. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2067 (noting that the language in section 271(c) can be
interpreted in various ways).
170. Id.
171. See supra Part II.B. and accompanying text (describing the decisions in Aro II).
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light of the ‘special force’ of the doctrine of stare decisis with regard to
questions of statutory interpretation . . . we proceed on the premise that
§ 271(c) requires knowledge of the existence of the patent that is
infringed.172

The Court’s arguments here—although certainly not obfuscatory or
wholly mistaken like those it made regarding the pre-1952 scienter
standard for indirect infringement—are unconvincing. First, if the Court
had closely examined the holding in Aro II, its associated legislative
history, and the pre-1952 case law—for the reasons presented earlier—it
would have recognized that the majority’s reasoning was clearly without
merit. Second, whether a party asks the Court to overrule precedent is no
bar on the Court’s authority to do so.173 Third, legislative inaction with
respect to one of the Court’s decisions is a shaky ground upon which to
infer acquiescence by Congress, except when “Congress considered and
rejected the ‘precise issue’ presented before the Court.”174 Finally,
although stare decisis has “special force” in the context of statutory
interpretation, it has none where prior precedent is clearly incorrect.175
For these reasons, the Court’s decision to reaffirm the holding of Aro II
lacks merit.
The Court’s failure to fully review the majority’s reasoning in Aro II
led it to a sort of “bootstrapping” error in concluding that “the same
172. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068 (first alteration in original).
173. For instance, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), a number
of dissenters would have overruled Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 936 (1976), despite the fact that the
parties did not request as much. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 397 (noting that the parties did not request
that Buckley be overruled); id. at 409 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that he would overrule
Buckley); id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating the same in an opinion joined by Justice
Scalia); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421–32, 2429 (2013) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (indicating that he would overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), a
precedent the parties did not request be overruled).
174. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 750 (2006); see also Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85, 106 (2007) (“Ordinarily, we resist reading congressional intent into congressional
inaction.”). But cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972) (“We continue to be loath, [fifty]
years after Federal Baseball and almost two decades after Toolson, to overturn those cases
judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those decisions to stand for so long
and, far beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove them
legislatively.”).
175. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995) (overruling a previous decision that
“had been proved manifestly erroneous”); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828–30 (1991)
(noting that the overruled cases had been “decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited
dissents challenging [their] basic underpinnings,” and had “defied consistent application by the
lower courts”); id. at 827 (“[W]hen governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, ‘this
Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.’” (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
665 (1944))); Smith, 321 U.S. at 66 (“[W]hen convinced of former error, this Court has never felt
constrained to follow precedent.”); see also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is not . . . [a] universal, inexorable command.”).
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knowledge is needed for induced infringement under § 271(b)” as under
section 271(c).176 The Court rightfully acknowledged that “the two
provisions have a common origin in the pre-1952 understanding of
contributory infringement, and the language of the two provisions creates
the same difficult interpretive choice.”177 Yet, without any further
reasoning, it concluded that “[i]t would thus be strange to hold that
knowledge of the relevant patent is needed under § 271(c) but not under
§ 271(b). Accordingly, we now hold that induced infringement under §
271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent
infringement.”178
Like its earlier reasoning, however, such a conclusion does not follow
from the premises relied upon by the Court. Although both provisions
are ambiguous, as discussed in Part II, there is a critical difference
between sections 271(b) and 271(c) that the Court in Global-Tech failed
to recognize. Specifically, the majority in Aro II premised its
acknowledged diversion from the common law rule on the specific
relationship between the words “knowing” and “infringement” in the
following phrase in section 271(c): “knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement.”179 In particular,
the majority found that given the modification of “infringement” by
“knowing,” the clause raised a question of whether Congress intended to
deviate from the pre-1952 rule by imposing a knowledge-of-the-patent
requirement.180
More particularly, the issue in Aro II arose solely because of the
peculiar, narrow wording of section 271(c), which reflected a
compromise in response to congressional testimony regarding the
appropriate scienter standard for that section.181 Five Justices relied on
that testimony and a related statutory amendment to find that Congress
deviated from historical precedent, while four Justices disagreed, arguing
that Congress codified that precedent.182 No such peculiar wording
appears in section 271(b), which states: “Whoever actively induces
176. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1964).
180. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Black’s reasoning in
Aro II).
181. See Aro II, 377 U.S. 476, 487–88 (1964); see also id. at 525–28 (Black, J., dissenting from
the judgment) (describing the history of the statute in the House Committee).
182. See id. at 487–88 (majority opinion on the judgment but dissenting on the scienter issue);
id. at 525–28 (Black, J., dissenting from the judgment but commanding a majority on the scienter
issue).
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infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” 183 Thus, unlike
section 271(c), there is no indication in the language of section 271(b)
whatsoever that Congress intended to deviate from the traditional scienter
standard. As such, contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion in GlobalTech, its holding in Aro II does not require imposing a knowledge-of-thepatent requirement on section 271(b).184
To be certain, scholars have made two other arguments that Aro II
should necessarily lead to a knowledge-of-the-patent requirement under
section 271(b), which are worth considering. First, in his well-known
patent law treatise, Donald Chisum suggests that because inducement
required a greater level of scienter than contributory infringement prior
to the 1952 Act—specifically, intent versus knowledge—“[t]he Aro II
requirement that the defendant have some knowledge of the patent as well
as the nature of his acts and their consequences would, therefore, seem to
apply equally to [s]ection 271(b) and 271(c).”185 While Professor
Chisum is correct as to the varying levels of scienter required under the
pre-1952 standards, he overlooks the fact that neither mode of indirect
infringement required knowledge of the patent prior to 1952. Thus, the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the text of section 271(c) as requiring
a deviation from pre-1952 precedent in Aro II should have no bearing on
interpreting section 271(b), which contains no similar exempting
language.186
Second, some commentators argue that by eliminating the knowledgeof-the-patent requirement under section 271(b), that section would
effectively render meaningless the stricter requirements under section
271(c), thereby recapturing activity that would otherwise escape liability
under section 271(c).187 In other words, if one supplies a component of
an infringing product, but does not know of the patent, that person would
escape liability under section 271(c), but might be subject to it under
section 271(b).188
However, the premise that section 271(b) would somehow “swallow”
section 271(c) is without basis. As an initial matter, the statutory
framework already contemplates that some activity that clearly avoids
183. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
184. Cf. MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 15.20 (2010) (“Thus, one can argue that the proper
outcome is to resist extending a precedent [Aro II] that is already questionable.”).
185. CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04[2] (2010).
186. See also MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 15.20 (2010) (addressing the same arguments
made by Professor Chisum and finding that they “are not particularly persuasive”).
187. See Holbrook, supra note 16, at 408 (“Using the broader intent standard risks swallowing
section 271(c) altogether.”).
188. See id.
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liability for contributory infringement under section 271(c) may
nonetheless constitute inducement of infringement under section 271(b).
For instance, the sales of staple commodities can never give rise to
liability under section 271(c), because such sales are expressly excluded
by the terms of the statutory provision, but may lead to liability under
section 271(b).189 In this regard, section 271(b) imposes a hurdle
(specific intent) not required by section 271(c).190 As the Supreme Court
recognized in Grokster, unlike section 271(c), mere “knowledge” of
potential infringing uses does not suffice for a finding of inducement
under section 271(b); rather, specific intent to encourage the acts
constituting infringement is necessary. 191 As such, even without a
knowledge-of-the-patent requirement, section 271(b) imposes more
stringent scienter requirements than section 271(c).192 Therefore, section
271(b) would not render section 271(c) meaningless or superfluous.193
189. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935 n.10 (2005)
(“Nor does the Patent Act’s exemption from liability for those who distribute a staple article of
commerce, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), extend to those who induce patent infringement, § 271(b).”).
190. See Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 521, 538–39 (1953) (“A significant difference between paragraphs (b) and (c) is
that proof of facts which comply with the provisions of the latter gives rise to liability without any
further proof of intent or inducement . . . .”); see also Charles E. Miller, Some Views on the Law of
Patent Infringement by Inducement, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 86, 97–98 (1971).
191. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37.
192. Indeed, Holbrook describes the animus for his position as a policy view that the sale of
goods capable of non-infringing uses should generally not lead to liability for indirect infringement,
even when the accused infringer intended to encourage the acts of direct infringement. See
Holbrook, supra note 16, at 408 (“An intent to induce any acts that might result in an infringement
would fall under section 271(b) even if there are considerable non-infringing uses. Third-party
liability should be the exception and not the rule.”). Yet, as Judge Rich explained, section 271(b)’s
higher scienter standard (namely, one of intent) was designed in part to “recapture” the sales of
staple articles and goods with substantial non-infringing uses, which would otherwise fall outside
the ambit of section 271(c). See Rich, supra note 190, at 538–39. Thus, Holbrook’s attempt to
reinterpret the statute to fit the mold of his policy preferences should be rejected.
193. One further potential counter-argument is that the sales of non-staple components with no
substantial infringing uses would constitute inducement under section 271(b) whenever the seller
had knowledge that such components were especially adapted for use in a patented combination,
because such knowledge has been held to be sufficient to prove intent to encourage direct
infringement. See N.Y. Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 (8th Cir. 1915) (holding that
intent may be inferred from knowledge that a component is especially adapted). Thus, if Aro II
remained good law, but was not applied to section 271(b), then activity that did not constitute
infringement under section 271(c)—because the accused infringer had no knowledge of the patentat-issue—might constitute infringement under section 271(b) without any effectively heightened
scienter standard under section 271(b)—precisely because knowledge that the component is
“especially adapted” is a requirement of section 271(c). In this limited set of cases, section 271(b)
would then arguably subsume (i.e., “swallow”) section 271(c), imposing liability where none
existed under section 271(c). Yet, there is a problem with this reasoning, which is a perfect
illustration of the Court’s missteps in Aro II and Global-Tech. Granted, the Eighth Circuit stated
in New York Scaffolding (which was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Grokster),
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In summary, the Court’s analysis of Aro II in Global-Tech contains
two major flaws and gaps. First, the Court basically glossed over the
reasoning of Aro II and essentially did nothing to investigate the
soundness of the arguments made by the majority in that case. Instead,
the Court conclusorily stated that there “is much to be said in favor of
both views expressed in Aro II.” If the Court had undertaken any suitable
modicum of scrutiny of the arguments of the majority in Aro II, it would
have found them lacking. Second, the Court engaged in dubious
“bootstrapping” arguments to find that the scienter requirements of
section 271(c) are determinative of those under section 271(b). Like its
analysis of Aro II, if the Court had carefully formulated its arguments, it
would have found otherwise.
CONCLUSION
As recounted above, the Supreme Court subverted the will of Congress
to codify the historical precedent regarding whether knowledge of the
patent-at-issue is required for a showing of indirect infringement.
Contrary to the historical doctrine, the Court in Aro II and Global-Tech
misread the case law and related legislative history to find that knowledge
of the patent is required for indirect liability. Indeed, in Global-Tech, it
appears that the Court—likely via one of its law clerks and unbeknownst
to the Justices—engaged in intentional obfuscation to reach its desired
policy outcome.
The Court’s derogation of its judicial obligations in these cases is
particularly problematic given that it appears defendants in a large
percentage of cases are unlikely to have knowledge of the patent-at-issue
at the time of suit. Of course, such a rule leads defendants to ignore

“One who makes and sells articles which are only adapted to be used in a patented combination
will be presumed to intend . . . that they shall be used in the combination of the patent.” Id. at 459
(cited with approval in Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933). Yet, read properly, this sentence merely implies
that intending to further the acts of direct infringement is required to meet the scienter required of
indirect infringement. Indeed, the New York Scaffolding opinion in the next sentence cites
Thomson-Houston II, the opinion by then-Judge Taft holding that knowledge of the patent was not
a necessary scienter requirement. See id. at 459. Thus, the very citation to cases such as New York
Scaffolding rebuts the assumption of scholars like Holbrook that knowledge of the patent should
be a requirement of section 271(c), and by implication, section 271(b). To the extent that New York
Scaffolding is misread so as to impose a knowledge-of-the-patent requirement—perhaps with
reference to the term “patented combination” in its holding—then activity that fell outside of
section 271(c) merely because the accused infringer had no knowledge of the patent would also fall
outside the scope of section 271(b), because the inference of intent from knowledge in such cases
would necessarily turn on the seller’s knowledge of the patent-at-issue—namely, that the seller
knew its component would be used in a “patented combination.” For these reasons, even in the
context of especially adapted components, such arguments fail.
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patents altogether. Although the Court in Global-Tech adopted a “willful
blindness” test, whereby purposeful ignorance could suffice for
knowledge, the Court set the bar for meeting this test quite high.194
Moreover, defendants can always immunize themselves against indirect
infringement by securing a suitable “opinion of counsel” letter—which is
typically straightforward to obtain for a sufficiently high fee paid to the
lawyer drafting it—stating the patent-at-issue is not infringed, invalid, or
unenforceable, thereby negating the requirement imposed by the Court
that the accused infringer must know he or she is furthering an
“infringing” act.195
The upshot of these results is that indirect infringement will be
exceedingly difficult to prove. Specifically, the Court’s new rule will
preclude pre-suit damages in the vast majority of cases in which the
defendant had no knowledge of the patent (given the difficulty of
showing “willful blindness”), as well as pre- and post-suit damages in
nearly all cases in which the defendant has secured an opinion letter (at
least until the deciding court makes a final ruling in the patentee’s
favor).196 Although there are certainly coherent policy arguments that
can be made in favor of such an approach—ones that are nonetheless
unconvincing—it is not the Court’s province to displace the codification
of precedent with its own policy-driven whims.197 It is even more
problematic when the Court does so under the guise of wholly misguided
legal arguments, ultimately resulting in patent law revisionism.

194. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2067–68 (2011). Under
the Court’s test, (1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a
fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact. See id.
195. See Rader, supra note 16, at 332 (“[O]btaining an opinion of counsel regarding inducement
would . . . enabl[e] a would-be inducer to forge ahead with the harmful activity, by having it rubberstamped by an outside law firm.”).
196. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(holding that a “good faith” belief in the invalidity of the patent may negate the scienter required
for inducing infringement).
197. See, e.g., Kumar, supra note 17, at 730 (suggesting that the Court adopted a knowledgeof-the-patent requirement to protect certain industries, like semiconductors, that would be
“adversely affected” without it).

